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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the verdict. Such an extension of power would eliminate many costly
new trials, lengthy appeals, and other injustices to the state and the
defendant.3 1 Thus, it is submitted that, rather than follow the proce-
dure of the principal case, adoption by the courts and/or legislatures
of any procedure which would obtain these advantages would be a step
forward in the administration of criminal justice.
JURISDICTION-FEDERAL STATE CONFLICT-RIGHT TO EXHAUST
PRIOR JURISDICTION
Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1956)
Petitioner was arrested while he was on probation from a federal
district court and was being held for prosecution by state authorities.
He petitioned the district court from which he was on probation for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that since he was a federal probationer
the state had no authority to proceed against him. The writ was issued
and petitioner released. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that
the issuance of the writ by the district court constituted an objection
to state invasion of federal jurisdiction.1
It is well established that in criminal prosecutions a court has juris-
diction over the accused when he is before the court regardless of how
his presence was secured.2 Equally well established is the principle
that in granting bail, parole, or probation, a sovereignty does not lose
legal custody of the person.3 Thus, a conflict may arise, as in the
principal case, where a court of one sovereignty acquires physical
custody of an individual while he is in legal custody of another sover-
eignty. It is generally stated that such a conflict between sovereignties
is to be resolved by an application of the rule of comity' which pro-
-vides that the sovereignty first acquiring jurisdiction (S-1) over a
person has the right to exhaust its jurisdiction before a second sover-
eignty (S-2) may proceed against that person. In the leading case of
31. For such a suggestion, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11 and comment (Draft
No. 2, 1954) (limiting reduction to cases of an unduly harsh character).
1. Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1956), 'ehearing denied, 235
F.2d 756, denial of rehearing vacated, Letter from Laughlin E. Waters to Harold
L. Satz, October 9, 1956.
2. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700
(1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
3. Taylor v. Taintor 83 U S. (16 Wall.) 366, 373 (1872) (bail); United States
ex rel. Lombardo v. Mcbonnell, 153 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1946) (parole); Grant
v. Guernsey, 63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933) (probation).
4. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); United States v. Marrin, 227 Fed.
314, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
5. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 366, 370 (1872). The doctrine has been extended to jurisdiction over prop-
erty. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 180 (1884). This rinciple applies whether
the S-1 sovereign is a state or the federal government. 0ovell v. Heyman, supra;
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Ponzi v. Fessenden,6 however, the Supreme Court held that an S-2
court may proceed against one in the legal custody of S-1 when an
administrative officer of S-1 has given his consent to such a proceed-
ing.
In finding a consent which will enable S-2 to proceed against an
individual despite the rule of comity, courts have not confined them-
selves to an affirmative manifestation of consent by an official or
agency of S-1, but have developed the rule that the lack of an objection
by S-1 is consent. 7 In the great majority of reported cases in this area,
the individual on bail, probation, or parole from S-1, who is in the
physical custody of S-2, has raised in the S-2 courts the question of
the propriety of S-2 exercising its jurisdiction. From the reported
cases one may conclude that as a practical matter S-1 officials rarely,
if ever, go into an S-2 court and object to the proceedings against one
under the legal custody of S-1.' Thus, the S-2 courts in almost all cases
find consent from the lack of such objection and, with the aid of this
"objection rule," proceed against the party without any interference
with their exercise of jurisdiction.
In a very few instances the propriety of S-2 exercising its jurisdic-
tion has been questioned, not in the courts of S-2, but rather in the
courts of S-1. Where there has been an affirmative manifestation of
consent in the courts of S-2 by an official of S-1, the courts of S-1 are
constrained to dismiss a petition for habeas corpus." When no such
manifestation exists, the further question arises, as in the principal
case, whether the courts of S-1 can, by issuing a writ of habeas corpus,
object to S-2 exercising its jurisdiction.
Of the few cases arising in the courts of S-1 there are two which
lend support to the position taken in the principal case. In Grant v.
Gu rnsey,- which involved facts identical to those of the principal
case, a court of appeals affirmed a district court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus effecting the release of its probationer from state
custody. In the Grant case, however, the court did not concern itself
with the problem whether the district court was objecting to the exer-
Hagen v. Lucas. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 403 (1836). The scope of this comment
is cqnfined to federal-state conflicts and does not include state-state conflicts which
involve the further consideration of interstate rendition.
6. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
7. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Stripling v. United States, 172
F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1949); Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1948).
S-2 courts will find consent where S-1 files a bill of detainer seeking to regain
custody of an individual only after S-2 has exhausted its jurisdiction. Rosenthal
v. Hunter, 164 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1947); United States v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp.
427 (W.D. Ark. 1947).
8. No cases have been found where an officer of S-1 has objected to S-2 juris-
diction in the courts of S-2.
9. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); In re Andrews, 236 Fed. 300(D. Vt. 1916).
1W. 63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933).
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cise of jurisdiction by S-2, but simply applied the basic precept of
comity-that S-2 may not proceed against an individual who is in the
legal custody of S-1. In the case of United States ex rel. Pasela v.
Fenno,"' the petitioner, while on bail from a federal district court, was
recalled into the navy and court-martialled. The appellate court, in
affirming the district court's dismissal of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, stated that when the order was entered in the district
court from which petitioner was on bail, the district court was con-
senting to the jurisdiction of S-2. Apparently this court would hold
that the issuance of a writ under similar circumstances would be a
proper objection to S-2 exercising its jurisdiction.
In United States ex rel. Spellman v. Murphy,12 however, the appel-
late court reversed a district court's issuance of a writ which removed
its probationer from state custody, holding that since the petitioner
was physically present in S-2 that sovereignty had authority to pro-
ceed against him. But the court also stated that the offended sover-
eignty, S-1, could invoke the rule of comity against S-2 and secure
custody of the petitioner. Since the court conceded S-1 had recourse
against S-2, but still reversed the issuance of habeas corpus, the case
indicates that the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the district
court from which the petitioner is on probation is not an objection to
S-2 exercising its jurisdiction. Further support for this position is
found in Ex parte Mawrrin" in which the district court stated that since
no officer of the department of justice of S-1 had objected to the
jurisdiction of S-2, the S-1 court could not secure the release of the
prisoner by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
When S-2 is faced with the prospect of having an S-1 court remove
a party from its custody, it may attempt to evade the interference with
its jurisdiction by arguing before the S-1 court that only S-i can
object to the S-2 exercise of jurisdiction,1 and that therefore, the
petitioner, who is in fact the one raising the objection, has no standing
in the courts of S-1.1 Another argument which may be presented by
11. 167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1948).
12. 217 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1954).
13. 164 Fed. 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1908).
14. See, e.g., Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d 532, 533 (10th Cir. 1948). Some
courts state that the petitioner has "no right to raise the issue" of an improper
exercise of jurisdiction by S-2. Craig v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948);Florio v. Edwards, 80 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1935) ; In re Fox, 51 Fed. 427 (N.D. Cal.
1892). It is not clear whether these courts mean the petitioner has no standing to
raise the issue by petition for a writ of habeas corpus or whether, in fact, that
while petitioner may call the court's attention to an invasion of its jursdicton in
this manner, only an objection by a representative of S-1 may properly defer S-21's
exercise of its jurisdiction. For courts clearly adopting the latter approach, see
Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d 532, 533 (10th Cir. 1948); Grant v. Guernsey,
63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933).
15. See, e.g., United States e7 rel. Spellman v. Murphy, 217 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.
1954).
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the officials of S-2 in such a situation is that there has been no objec-
tion by the court of S-1, or an official of S-1, in the courts of S-2.16
These arguments seem to be without merit, for if S-1 has the right to
object and preclude S-2 from proceeding against the petitioner, it
would seem to be immaterial in what manner S-2 is notified of the S-1
objection.
It is submitted that S-2 courts, jealously guarding their jurisdiction
and desiring to proceed against defendants when they are before the
courts,'" have given only nominal recognition to the rule of comity.
The rule is in most instances evaded by the application of the "objec-
tion rule" for, as noted previously, rarely is there any objection by
officials of S-1 in the S-2 proceeding. Since S-2 has a vital interest in
the timely prosecution of alleged criminals within its jurisdiction, s
the results reached by the S-2 courts in the probation and parole cases
seem both justified and desirable. It seems wholly unreasonable to
hold, as did the court in the principal case, that probation or parole
is a protective cloak of immunity which defers prosecution for crimi-
nal offenses until after the parole or probationary period has expired.
A holding such as that in the principal case is the result of S-2
courts giving recognition to the rule of comity and, in fact, circum-
venting it by applying the "objection rule." Such reasoning by the S-2
courts'" leaves the door open to an interference with their jurisdiction
when the defendant seeks a writ of habeas corpus in an S-1 court. It
would not be unrealistic for courts to recognize that a parolee or pro-
bationer is in the legal custody of S-1 for purposes of rehabilitation
and summary proceedings for violation of parole or probation, but that
for purposes of determining whether S-2 may proceed against such a
party, he is not in the legal custody of S-1 in the sense that an S-2
43. Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.
1956) (Appellant argued there had been no objection in the state court by the
federal court or a federal court officer.).
17. An apt illustration of a court's reluctance to decline exercising its juris-
diction over the person once such jurisdiction attaches is found in a series of
cases from the tenth circuit. In Grant v. Guernsey, 63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933),
the court, acting as an S-1 court, removed its probationer from state custody
thiough the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, stating that under the rule of
comity no other jurisdiction could proceed against the prisoner until the S-1jurisdiction was exhausted. Later, however, in Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d
532, 533 (10th Cir. 1948), the court, now acting as an S-2 court, refused to release
a prisoner who was on parole from an S-1 jurisdiction, stating that since S-1
had not objected to the jurisdiction of this court it could proceed. In Craig v.
Hunter, 167 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1948), the court entered a similar holding to
that in the Rawls case even though the petitioner was an escapee from an S-1
prison.
18. As time passes witnesses die, or are hard to locate; memories become vague;
and prosecuting officials are less likely to conduct the prosecution of a "stale"
case. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
19. It should be recalled that the "objection rule" is largely a product of S-2
courts seeking to evade the impact of the rule of comity. See text supported by
note 7 supra.
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prosecution -is .precluded by the rule of comity. 20 Such an analysis
eliminates the "objection rule" and renders the rule of comity inappli-
cable. Thus, the same results -will be reached as are now being attained
in the great majority of cases.21 In addition, S-1 will be precluded
from objecting to S-2's exercise of jurisdiction in the few instances
where, as in the principal case, habeas corpus is sought in a court, of
S-1. On the other hand, where the party is on bail from S-1, it is sub-
mitted that there should be a strict adherence to the rule of comity in
the absence of a "real" consent by S-1. In this situation S-1 is actively
engaged in prosecuting the individual on bail, and it would seem that
in the interest of comity and the due administration of justice, S-1
should be able to proceed without interference from another sover-
eignty. _.
TAXATION-TAX COURT-POWER TO VACATE A FINAL DECISION
Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
25 U.S.L. Week 3133 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1956) (No. 371)
Four months after a decision' had been rendered, the taxpayer filed
a motion in the tax court to vacate the decision and to grant a rehear-
ing, on the ground of excusable neglect of counsel. Although the
Internal Revenue Code provides that a decision of the tax court be-
comes final after expiration of the three-month period allowed for
filing a petition for review,2 the tax court concluded that extraordi-
nary circumstances existed which warranted granting the motion. On.
rehearing the tax court again held for the Commissioner' and the tax-
payer filed a timely petition for review in the court of appeals. The
court, in dismissing the petition for review, held that since the first
decision of the tax court had become final under the statute, the tax
court as an administrative agency had no inherent power to vacate
such a decision; and hence, the court of appeals was without jurisdic-
tion to review the second decision.4
The result in the principal case is consistent with the majority of
cases dealing with the power of the tax court to vacate a decision after
the expiration of the period for review.5 These cases, however, in
20. See Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598, 610 (9th Cir. 1956) (dissenting
opinion) ("One can be subject to a court's orders without being in the full 'custody
of the law,' without having a protective casing of immunity.").
21. See text supported by notes 7-8 supra.
1. Bessie Lasky, 22 T.C. 13 (1954).
2. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7481(1), 7483.
3. Bessie Lasky, P-H 1955 T.C. Mem. Dec. 55254-A.
4. Lasky v. Comm'r, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L.
WEEK 3133 (U.S. Aug. 31, 1956) (No. 371).
5.- White's Will v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1944); Monjar v. Comm'r,
140 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1944); McCarthy v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1943?;
Denholm & McKay Co. v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1942); Swall v. Comm r,
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